It seems like the Soviet legacy in some form plays a role in shaping Kyrgyzstan’s political consciousness. There is a great deal of debate over the modern effects of Civil Law and Common Law philosophies on the systems they created. However, it seems that the two are relatively similar compared with the notions of legality in post-Soviet countries; rather than simply having a different interpretation of the role of laws, it seems that the notion of law itself is up for debate. While bribes certainly exist in Western society, they are, by and large, not a way of life as they seem to be here. The lack of a notion of government accountability to the citizen (’by the people, for the people’) and of personal capital ownership have made the establishment of democracy much more difficult and may explain why Akayev was allowed to tighten his grip on the country for so long.

A sampling of the questions I’m asking interviewees:

- If your organization has been in Kyrgyzstan a long time, where are its effects? How are you tracking progress beyond simple but opaque metrics such as the number of NGO’s (there are many “paper NGO’s” here) or people attending a conference?

- Given the consolidation of power at the top of the Kyrgyz government, how can grassroots programs have an effect without complementary pressure on the executive and legislative branches?

- How will your organization deal with economic realities, such as general poverty that prevents people from buying newspapers or paying membership dues to an NGO?

- Do you think that the Soviet mentality (noted here and here, search pages for ‘mentality’) will continue to make a difference (if it ever did)? Do you think that there is a generation gap in Kyrgyzstan, and that it is just a matter of time before people born after 1970 (an arbitrary but useful distinction) come to power?

The answers are interesting, to say the least.

Register and suggest somore questions in the comments!

Despite efforts to coordinate various groups (roundtables, etc.), it seems like there is a general lack of organization between international donor groups. Each takes its own philosophy and tries to apply it to the problems that they see dominant in Kyrgyzstan using their own combination of technical and financial resources. As a result of this, I have gotten many divergent opinions on the same things, particularly the causes of the March 24 ‘revolution’ (I have learned to put it in quotes) and the future of the country. Some interviews have been frustratingly unhelpful, others extremely useful (and not the ones I initially thought). Anyway, the work continues next week…

The research has begin here in Bishkek. 3 productive interviews today. It looks like I will be able to gather a high volume of interviews, though if I had studied more Russian before I left, I could have been able to speak to the real players…

More coming soon.

Thought of the day: Kyrgyzstan pre-revolution = Mexico pre-2000? (’the perfect dictatorship’)

This post is a bit (a lot) overdue, but here it is:

Kyrgyzstan is heating up as the July 10 election approaches. incidents are on the rise, according to EurasiaNet. Much of the chaotic violence seems to be in the southern city of Osh, although the assasination of MP Jyrgalbek Surabaldiyev, a close ally of ex-president Akayev, took place in broad daylight in Bishkek (in the north).

The two leading candidates are interim President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Feliks Kulov. Both are strong defenders of the overthrow of Akayev, though it remains to be seen how genuine each is. Hopefully north-south issues will not escalate; although both candidates speak of unification, it will be difficult to gauge popular sentiment. Whoever wins will need to take firm control of the government to curb the corruption and organized crime that lead to chaos. It is good to see the Supreme Court back at work; restoring the rule of law should be one of the top priorities of the new government - it seems to be the fastest way out of the current political mess.